77. Quoted in Khalidi, All That Remains, xxxi.

78. Quoted in Nahum Goldmann, The Jewish Paradox, trans. Steve Cox (NewYork: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 99.

79. Quoted in Ian Lustick, "To Build and to Be Built By: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall," Israel Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 200.

80. Quoted in Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 12.

81. Geoffrey Aronson, Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990); Amnon Barzilai, "A Brief History of the Missed Opportunity," Ha'aretz, June 5, 2002; Amnon Barzilai, "Some Saw the Refugees as the Key to Peace," Ha'aretz, June 11, 2002; Moshe Behar, "The Peace Process and Israeli Domestic Politics in the 1990s," Socialism and Democracy 16, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002); Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Adam Hanieh and Catherine Cook, "A Road Map to the Oslo Cul-de-Sac," Middle East Report Online, May 15, 2003; "Israel's Interests Take Primacy: An Interview with Dore Gold," in hitterlemons.org, "What Constitutes a Viable Palestinian State?" March 15, 2004, edition 10; Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: The Real Legacy of Ariel Sharon (London: Verso, 2003); Nur Masalha, Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Tanya Reinhart, The Road Map to Nowhere: Israel/Palestine Since 2003 (London: Verso, 2006); Sara Roy, "Erasing the 'Optics' of Gaza," Daily Star (online), February 14, 2004; and "36 Years, and Still Counting," Ha'aretz, September 26, 2003.

82. Quoted in Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1997), 147. Meir also said, "It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist." Quoted in Masalha, Imperial Israel, 47.

83. Dayan quoted in Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1997), 12. Regarding the views of other IDF generals, see ibid. On Ben-Gurion's thinking, see Morris, Righteous Victims, 261, 290.

84. Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 11.

85. Quoted in Hanieh and Cook, "Road Map." Also see Akiva Eldar, "On the Same Page, Ten Years On," Ha'aretz, November 5, 2005; David Grossman, "The Night Our Hope for Peace Died," Guardian, November 4, 2005; and Michael Jansen, "A Practice That 'Prevents the Emergence of a Palestinian State,'" Jordan Times (online), November 10, 2005. Shlomo Ben-Ami makes it clear that not only Rabin but also his immediate successor, Shimon Peres, was opposed to creating a Palestinian state. Scars of War, 220. Finally, a clear majority of Israelis were opposed to creating a Palestinian state during Rabin's tenure as prime minister (1992-95). It was not until 1997 that at least half of Israeli Jews supported the establishment of a Palestinian state. At the time of the 1993 Oslo Accords, 35 percent favored creating a Palestinian state. Ben Meir and Shaked, "The People Speak," 64-65.

86. Hillary Clinton quoted in Tom Rhodes and Christopher Walker, "Congress Tells Israel to Reject Clinton's Pullout Plan," Times (London), May 8, 1998. On the White House response, see James Bennet, "Aides Disavow Mrs. Clinton on Mideast," New York Times, May 8, 1998. Also see Robin Dorf, "News Analysis: What Motivated Hillary's Call for a Palestinian State?" JTA.org, May 15, 1998; "Hillary's Folly," Jewish Week editorial, May 15, 1998; and Brian Knowlton, "Mrs. Clinton Starts Storm by Backing 'Palestine,'" International Herald Tribune, May 8, 1998.

87. "Ex-PM Shamir Objects to Palestinian State, but Still Supports Sharon," Ha'aretz, November 26, 2002; Benjamin Netanyahu, "A Limited Palestinian State," Washington Post, June 20, 2003. In a 1998 interview, Shamir said that Israel's boundaries ran "from the border of the kingdom of Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea" and said the "greatest danger" facing Israel was "the establishment of a Palestinian state in Israel." See "Yitzhak Shamir: A Lifetime of Activism," Middle East Quarterly 6, no. 2 (June 1999).

88. In a speech in October 2005, President Ahmadinejad reportedly called for Israel to be "wiped off the map," a statement widely interpreted as threatening the physical destruction

of the Jewish state and its inhabitants. A more accurate translation of Ahmadinejad's statement is "the occupation regime over Jerusalem should vanish from the page of time" (or alternatively, "be eliminated from the pages of history"). Instead of calling for the physical destruction of Israel, Ahmadinejad was suggesting that Israel's control over Jerusalem and Palestine should be seen as a temporary condition that should be reversed, like Soviet control of Eastern Europe or the shah's regime in Iran. While still provocative and highly objectionable, calling for the political dismantlement of the Jewish state in Palestine is not the same as calling for the physical destruction of Israel or its population. See Ethan Bronner, "Just How Far Did They Go, Those Words Agains Israel?" New York Times, June 11, 2006; Jonathan Steele, "Lost in Translation," Guardian, June 14, 2006; and "Iranian President at Tehran Conference: Very Soon, This Stain of Disgrace [i.e., Israel] Will Be Purged from the Center of the Islamic World—and This Is Attainable,'" Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series no. 1013, October 28, 2005.

89. "Bombs," New Republic editorial, August 27 & September 3, 2001; Martin Peretz, "Good Fight," New Republic, May 27, 2002; and Martin Peretz, "Blows to Israel Must Never Go Unanswered," Los Angeles Times, September 5, 2003. Regarding Dershowitz, his most relevant work is The Case for Israel (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2003). For an incisive critique of that book, see Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). Also see Michael Desch, "The Chutzpah of Alan Dershowitz," American Conservative, December 5, 2005; and "Dershowitz v. Desch," American Conservative, January 16, 2006.

90. Yaakov Katz, "IDF the Most Moral Army in the World,'" Jerusalem Post, June 11, 2006; Leslie Susser, "Israelis Question Army Morality," Jewishjournal.com, December 17, 2004; and "Cabinet Communique," Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 12, 2004, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2004/Cabinet%20Communique%2012-Dec-2004. Also see Richard Cohen, "Truth Massacred," Washington Post, August 6, 2002; and Neve Gordon, "Israel's Slippery Moral Slope," In These Times (online), January 31, 2003.

91. Meron Benvenisti, "The Model of the Mythological Sabra," Ha'aretz, September 12, 2002.

92. Morris, Righteous Victims, chaps. 2-5.

93. Quoted in Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion: The Burning Ground, 1886-1948 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 544.

94. Morris, Birth Revisited. Many Israeli documents concerning the events of 1948 remain classified; Morris anticipates "that with respect to both expulsions and atrocities, we can expect additional revelations as the years pass and more Israeli records become available." Morris, "Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus," 49. In fact, he maintains that the reported cases of rape he knows about are "just the tip of the iceberg." See Shavit, "Survival of the Fittest."

95. Quoted in Pappe, Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 69. For background on Ben-Gurion's comment, see ibid., 61-72.

96. Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 432. Also see ibid., 126-53, 178-84.

97. Gabby Bron, "Egyptian POWs Ordered to Dig Graves, Then Shot by Israeli Army," Yedioth Ahronoth, August 17, 1995; Ronal Fisher, "Mass Murder in the 1956 Sinai War," Ma'ariv, August 8, 1995 (copies of these two pieces can be found in Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 3 [Spring 1996]: 148-55); Galal Bana, "Egypt: We Will Turn to the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague If Israel Will Not Compensate Murdered Prisoners of War," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2002; Zehavit Friedman, "Personal Reminiscence: Remembering Ami Kronfeld," in Jewish Voice for Peace, Jewish Peace News (online), September 25, 2005; Katherine M. Metres, "As Evidence Mounts, Toll of Israeli Prisoner of War Massacres Grows," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (online), February/March 1996; Roee Nahmias, "Egypt May Petition Hague over 'Murder of POWs,'" Ynetnews.com, March 6, 2007; Roee Nahmias, "Former Meretz Leader Decries 1967 War Crimes," Ynetnews.com, March 3, 2007; Meron Rapoport, "Into the Valley of Death," Ha'aretz, February 13, 2007; and Segev, 1967, 371-76.

98. Avnery, "Crying Wolf?" CounterPunch.org, March 15, 2003; Robert Blecher, "Living on the

Edge: The Threat of 'Transfer in Israel and Palestine," MERIP, Middle East Report Online 225 (Winter 2002); Kimmerling, Politicide, 28. Also see Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), 97; Morris, Righteous Victims, 328-29; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (NewYork: Seven Stories Press, 2002), 8; Tom Segev, "The Spirit of the King David Hotel," Ha'aretz, July 23, 2006; and Segev, 1967, 400-12, 523-42. Morris reports that 120,000 Palestinians applied to return to their homes right after the 1967 war, but Israel allowed only about 17,000 to come back. Righteous Victims, 329. 99. Avnery, "Crying Wolf?"; Ami Kronfeld, "Avnery on Ethnic Cleansing and a Personal Note," in Jewish Voice for Peace, Jewish Peace News (online), March 17, 2003; and Metres, "As Evidence Mounts."

100. Danny Rubinstein, "Roads, Fences and Outposts Maintain Control in the Territories,"

Ha'aretz, August 12, 2003.

101. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut," February 7, 1983. The report is commonly called "the Kahan Commission Report" after its chairman, Yitzhak Kahan. Also see Morris, Righteous Victims, 542-49; and Shlaim, Iron Wall, 415-17. Israeli soldiers did not do the killing at Sabra and Shatila; it was done by a Lebanese Christian militia (Phalangists) allied with Israel. After the IDF encircled the two Palestinian refugee camps, Sharon "ordered the IDF to allow the Phalangists to enter the . . . camps." The Phalangists and the Palestinians were not only bitter enemies, but the Phalangists were bent on revenge because their leader had just been assassinated. They were almost certain to massacre the Palestinians, a point that Israeli leaders involved in the operation knew or should have known. Once the killing started, Israeli soldiers quickly became aware that a massacre was taking place "but did nothing to stop it." Shlaim, Iron Wall, 416. President Bush has hailed former prime minister Ariel Sharon as a "man of peace," but questions concerning violence against civilians have dogged him for years. For example, in 1953, he commanded a unit that attacked the Jordanian town of Qibya and killed sixty-nine civilians; two-thirds of them were women and children. According to Benny Morris, "Sharon and the IDF subsequently claimed the villagers had hidden in cellars and attics and the troops had been unaware of this when they blew up the buildings. But in truth the troops had moved from house to house, firing through windows and doorways, and Jordanian pathologists reported that most of the dead had been killed by bullets and shrapnel rather than by falling masonry or explosions. In any event, the operational orders, from CO Central Command to the units involved . . . had explicitly ordered 'destruction and maximum killing.'" Righteous Victims, 278. Also see ibid., 276-79, 294-95, 494-560; Benziman, Sharon; Uzi Benziman, "The Cock's Arrogance," Ha'aretz, June 15, 2003; Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (NewYork: Anchor Books, 1990), chaps. 6-7; Kimmerling, Politicide; Ze'ev Schiff and EhudYa'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, trans. Ina Friedman (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 250-85; and Shlaim, Iron Wall, 90-92, 149-50, 384-423.

102. Perry Anderson, "Scurrying Towards Bethlehem," New Left Review 10 (July-August 2001): 5.

103. Morris, Righteous Victims, 341. For a detailed account of how Israel treats the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, see Amira Hass, Reporting from Ramallah: An Israeli Journalist in an Occupied Land, ed. and trans. Rachel Leah Jones (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2003). On Israel's use of torture, see B'Tselem and Hamoked (Center for the Defense of the Individual), "Utterly Forbidden: The Torture and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian Detainees," draft report, Jerusalem, April 2007; Glenn Frankel, "Prison Tactics a Longtime Dilemma for Israel," Washington Post, June 16, 2004; Ron Kampeas, "State Report Claims Israel Tortures Palestinian Detainees," JTA.org, March 8, 2007; Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, '"Ticking Bombs': Testimonies of Torture Victims in Israel," draft report, Jerusalem, May 2007; William F. Schulz, "An Israeli Interrogator, and a Tale of Torture," letter to New York Times, December 27, 2004; and Aviram Zino, "Report: High Court Permits Torture of Palestinians," Ynetnews.com, May 30, 2007. Israel has also been accused by B'Tselem of using Palestinian children as human shields. See "Israeli Soldies Use Palestinian Minors and

an Adult as Human Shields in the Operation in Nablus," B'Tselem news release, Jerusalem, March 8, 2007.

104. The data and the quotes in this paragraph and the next one are from Swedish Save the Children, "The Status of Palestinian Children During the Uprising in the Occupied Territories," Excerpted Summary Material, Jerusalem, January 1990, in Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 136-46. Also see Joshua Brilliant, "Officer Tells Court Villagers Were Bound, Gagged and Beaten. 'Not Guilty' Plea at 'Break Bones' Trial, "Jerusalem Post, March 30, 1990; Joshua Brilliant, '"Rabin Ordered Beatings,' Meir Tells Military Court," Jerusalem Post, June 22, 1990; Jackson Diehl, "Rights Group Accuses Israel of Violence Against Children in Palestinian Uprising," Washington Post, May 17, 1990; James A. Graff, "Crippling a People: Palestinian Children and Israeli State Violence," Alif 13 (1993); Morris, Righteous Victims, 586-95; and Ronald R. Stockton, "Intifada Deaths," Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 4 (Summer 1990).

105. "Unbridled Force," Ha'aretz editorial, March 16, 2003. For other evidence, see Jonathan Cook, "Impunity on Both Sides of the Green Line," MERIP, Middle East Report Online, November 23, 2005; "When Everything Is Permissible," Ha'aretz editorial, June 6, 2005; "It Can Happen Here," Ha'aretz editorial, November 22, 2004; Chris McGreal, "Snipers with Children in Their Sights," Guardian, June 28, 2005; Chris McGreal, "Israel Shocked by Image of Soldiers Forcing Violinist to Play at Roadblock," Guardian, November 29, 2004; Greg Myre, "Former Israeli Soldiers Tell of Harassment of Palestinians," New York Times, June 24, 2004; Reuven Pedatzur, "The Message to the Soldiers Was Clear," Ha'aretz, December 13, 2004; and Conal Urquhart, "Israeli Soldiers Tell of Indiscriminate Killings by Army and a Culture of Impunity," Guardian, September 6, 2005.

106. Reuvan Pedatzur, "More than a Million Bullets," Ha'aretz, June 29, 2004; and Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 387-88.

107. These figures cover the period between September 29, 2000, and December 31, 2005, and are taken from B'Tselem press release, January 4, 2006.

108. Nathan Guttman, '"It's a Terrible Thing, Living with the Knowledge That You Crushed Our Daughter,'" Ha'aretz, April 30, 2004; Joshua Hammer, "The Death of Rachel Corrie," MotherJones.com, September/October 2003; Adam Shapiro, "Remembering Rachel Corrie," Nation, March 18, 2004; and Tsahar Rotem, "British Peace Activist Shot by IDF Troops in Gaza Strip," Ha'aretz, April 11, 2003.

109. Amnesty International reports that since the Second Intifada began in the fall of 2000, "Israeli authorities have routinely failed to investigate allegations of unlawful killings and other abuses of Palestinians by Israeli forces and settlers . . . Israeli forces have killed thousands of Palestinians, many of them unlawfully, yet scarcely any such incidents have been investigated properly and fewer still have resulted in the perpetrator being brought to justice . . . In the very few cases in which the Israeli authorities have conducted serious investigations into killings of Palestinians, resulting prosecutions have generally been unsuccessful or have resulted in the imposition of sentences that were not commensurate with the gravity of the offense." Amnesty International, "Road to Nowhere," December 2006, 27-28.

110. For a detailed discussion of Israeli behavior toward the Palestinians that makes extensive use of reports from different human rights groups, see Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, chaps. 4-9.

111. Quoted in Molly Moore, "Ex-Security Chiefs Turn on Sharon," Washington Post, November 15, 2003; "Ex-Shin Bet Heads Warn of'Catastrophe'Without Peace Deal," Ha'aretz, November 15, 2003. These comments were based on an interview in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth on November 14, 2003. A copy of the interview, titled "We Are Seriously Concerned About he Fate of the State of Israel," can be found on the Global Policy Forum website, www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/2003/1118fate.htm.

112. For example, B'Tselem reported that "in July [2006], the Israeli military killed 163 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, 78 of whom (48 percent) were not taking part in the hostilities when

they were killed. Thirty-six of the fatalities were minors, and 20 were women. In the West Bank, 15 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces in July. The number of Palestinian fatalities in July was the highest in any month since April 2002." August 3, 2006, press release, www.btselem.org/english/Press_Releases/20060803.asp. Amnesty International reports that from June 27, 2006, the date the IDF moved back into Gaza, through the end of November 2006, Israeli forces "killed more than 400 Palestinians and injured more than 1500 others in the Gaza Strip, including many unarmed civilians. Some 80 of those killed were children and more than 300 children were injured. In the same period, two Israeli civilians were killed and some 20 were injured in the south of Israel by rockets fired by Palestinian armed groups from Gaza." "Road to Nowhere," 8-9.

113. Quoted in Rory McCarthy, "UN Condemns Massive Human Rights Abuses in Gaza Strip," Guardian, November 21, 2006. For descriptions of the pain that the IDF has inflicted on the Palestinians living in Gaza, see Amnesty International, "Road to Nowhere," 7-13; Gideon Levy, "Gaza's Darkness," Ha'aretz, September 3, 2006; and OCHA, "The Humanitarian Monitor."

114. Quoted in Bill Maxwell, "U.S. Should Reconsider Aid to Israel," St. Petersburg Times (online), December 16, 2001. Also see Ron Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?" Survival 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 37.

115. Indeed, had Israel lost the Six-Day War in 1967 and some Arab ruler kept its population subjugated in the same conditions that the Palestinians have endured, the Israelis would almost certainly have used terrorism against their oppressors, and some Jews in the diaspora almost certainly would have mobilized to aid them, just as Irish Americans and overseas Tamils have backed terrorist groups in their ancestral homelands.

116. Morris, Righteous Victims, 147, 201. Also see Lenni Brenner, The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (London: Zed Books, 1984), 100; and Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Vol. 2, 1929-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 238. Morris notes that during the 1948 war, the main Jewish terrorist groups "knowingly planted bombs in bus stops with the aim of killing non-combatants, including women and children." Birth Revisited, 80.

117. J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence 1929-1949 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 103-253; Johann Hari, "Israel Should Remember Its Own 'Terrorist' Origins," Independent, July 24, 2006; Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1995); Bruce Hoffmann, The Failure of British Military Strategy Within Palestine, 1939-1947 (Israel: Bar-Ilan University, 1983); Morris, Righteous Victims, 173-80; and Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), chap. 22. According to Haim Levenberg, 210 of the 429 casualties from Jewish terrorism in Palestine during 1946 were civilians. The other 219 were police and soldiers. See Levenberg, Military Preparations, 72.

118. Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 336-40.

119. Quoted in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, 485-86; and Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 340. On Shamir, see Avishai Margalit, "The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir," New York Review of Books, May 14, 1992. Shamir also said that his "proudest achievement" was "when, thanks to our efforts, we were able to fully unite all the underground groups fighting for the liberation of Israel." See "Shamir: Lifetime of Activism."

120. Barzilai, "Brief History."

121. "Palestinian Authority," New Republic editoria, February 18, 2002, 7.

122. The most objective accounts of what happened at Camp David and in the subsequent six months include Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002, trans. Susan Fairfield (NewYork: Other Press, 2003); Jeremy Pressman, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003); Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba"; Jerome Slater, "What Went

Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 2 (July 2001); Deborah Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," New York Times, July 26, 2001; and Swisher, Truth About Camp David.

123. The figures in this paragraph and the next one are drawn from Pressman, "Visions in Collision," 16-18. Baraks offer also included a I percent land swap outside the West Bank, so some commentators describe his offer as being 92 percent rather than 91 percent.

124. The original territory assigned to Britain in the treaties that ended World War I included the east and west banks of the Jordan River. But in 1922, Britain created Transjordan (which later became Jordan) on the east bank. Henceforth, the British Mandate in Palestine included the territory that today comprises Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. When we refer to Mandate Palestine, we mean the post-1922 territories, of which Israel makes up 78 percent and the Occupied Territories 22 percent.

125. Describing a lengthy interview with Ehud Barak about what happened at Camp David, Benny Morris writes: "But in the West Bank, Barak says, the Palestinians were promised a continuous piece of sovereign territory except for a razor-thin Israeli wedge running from Jerusalem through from Maale Adumim to the Jordan River." Benny Morris, "Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)," New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002, 44. Also see the map in Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba," 46. For the Palestinian version of what the map looked like, see Orient House (Jerusalem), "Israel's Concessions," Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2000; and the map titled "Palestinian Characterization of the Final Proposal at Camp David," in Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004). Contrary to both Barak and the Palestinians, Ross claims that the final map at Camp David gave the Palestinians control over a continuous piece of territory in the West Bank. See "Map Reflecting Actual Proposal at Camp David," ibid. Ross's assertion is not plausible, however, as even Barak admits that an Israeli-controlled road connecting Jerusalem with the Jordan River Valley would have bisected the West Bank. As long as Israel controlled that strategically important valley, it would need to be able to reach it with at least one well-defended connector road. Whereas Barak envisioned one connector road running eastward from Jerusalem, the Palestinians apparently envisioned a second one running eastward from the Ariel settlement to the Jordan River Valley. One might argue that the Israelis would eventually abandon those connector roads when they surrendered the Jordan River Valley. As noted, however, there was no guarantee that the Israelis would ever leave that valley, and even if they did, there was no guarantee that they would abandon the connector roads. The main reason for this continuing confusion about what the final map at Camp David looked like is that no official map was ever drawn up and, "at Barak's insistence, no written records were kept." Jerome Slater, "The Missing Pieces in the Missing Peace," Tikkun.org, May/June 2005.

126. Pressman, "Visions in Collision," 18.

127. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 243-51; Slater, "What Went Wrong?"; and Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace."

128. Quoted in "Norman Finkelstein & Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami Debate: Complete Transcript," Democracy Now! radio and TV broadcast, February 14, 2006.

129. There is no evidence that Arafat stared the First Intifada either. See Morris, Righteous Victims, 561. "The main energizing force of the Intifada," Morris writes, "was the frustration of the national aspirations of the 650,000 inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, 900,000 of the West Bank, and 130,000 of East Jerusalem, who wanted to live in a Palestinian state and not as stateless inhabitants under a brutal, foreign military occupation." Ibid., 562.

130. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 284-85.

131. Quoted in Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies 22, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 116. Also see Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001); Henry Siegman, "Partners for War," New York Review of Books, January 16, 2003, 24; Henry Siegman,

"Sharon and the Future of Palestine," NewYork Review of Books, December 2, 2004, 12; and Slater, "Missing Pieces."

132. Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, Final Report, April 30, 2001, 7.

133. Ibid., 5.

134. Ian S. Lustick, "Through Blood and Fire Shall Peace Arise," Tikkun.org, May/June 2002; Pressman, "The Second Intifada"; Mouin Rabbani, "A Smorgasbord of Failure: Oslo and the Al-Aqsa Intifada," in The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid, ed. Roane Carey (London: Verso, 2001), 69-89; Sara Roy, "Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy," Current History 101, no. 651 (January 2002); and Sara Roy, "Ending the Palestinian Economy," Middle East Policy 9, no. 4 (December 2002).

135. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 264.

136. Roy, "Why Peace Failed," 9.

137. Ron Dudai, "Trigger Happy: Unjustified Shooting and Violation of the Open-Fire Regulations During the al-Aqsa Intifada," B'Tselem draft report, March 2002.

138. Yasser Arafat, "The Palestinian Vision of Peace," New York Times, February 3, 2002; Yasser Arafat, text of press conference, Geneva, December 14, 1988, in journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 3 (Spring 1989): 180-81; "Palestinians Affirm Israel's Right to Exist," CNN.com, December 14, 1998; Pressman, "Visions in Collision," 24-27; Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Jerome M. Segal, Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1989), chap. 1. One might argue that Arafat's commitment to the right of return for the Palestinians reveals that he was still bent on destroying Israel. But Arafat surely recognized that Israeli leaders would never agree to a peace settlement that would allow large numbers of Palestinians to move back into Israel. At the same time, however, it made good sense for Arafat not to soften his position on right of return before the negotiations, so that he could use this issue as a bargaining chip. Not surprisingly, there is considerable evidence that Palestinian leaders (including Arafat before he died) recognize that they will have to make major concessions on this important issue to get a final agreement. See Akiva Eldar and David Landau, "Arafat: Israel Is Jewish; Won't Cite Figure on Refugees," Ha'aretz, June 18, 2004; Associated Press, "PA Minister Shaath: Palestinian Right of Return Is Negotiable," Ha'aretz, August 20, 2003; Pressman, "Visions in Collision," 28-33; and M. J. Rosenberg, "Intractable Issue?" Weekly Opinion Column, Issue #144, Israel Policy Forum, Washington, DC, July 18, 2003.

139. Akiva Eldar, "Popular Misconceptions," Ha'aretz, June 11, 2004; Akiva Eldar, "While They Were Sleeping," Ha'aretz, September 17, 2001; Danny Rubenstein, "The Stronger Side Creates Reality," Ha'aretz, June 16, 2004; and Emmanuel Sivan, "What the General Is Allowed," Ha'aretz, June 14, 2004.

140. Pressman, "Visions in Collision," 25.

141. "Official Palestinian Response to the Clinton Parameters (and letter to international community)," January 1, 2001, www.robat.scl.net/content/NAD/negotiations/clinton_parameters/ param2.php.

142. "Excerpts: White House Spokesman on Clinton-Arafat Talks," issued by Press Section, U.S. embassy in Israel, Janury 3, 2001; Transcript of "Clinton Speech on Mideast Peace Parameters (January 7, 2001)," Office of the White House Press Secretary, January 8, 2001; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 344. Also see Akiva Eldar, "The Battle for Public Opinion," Ha'aretz, June 24, 2002, and Pressman, "Visions in Collision," 20, both of which make clear that Israel also had serious reservations about the Clinton parameters.

143. Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 349-50.

144. Jeff Jacoby, "America Takes Side of Israel," Boston Globe, March 26, 2006. Block is quoted in Tony Czuczka, "Under Fire, Israel Lobby Rallies US Backers," EUX.TV: The Europe Channel (online), March 10, 2007. Also see Mart, Eye on Israel; and Martin Peretz, "Oil and Vinegar: Surveying the Israel Lobby," New Republic, April 10, 2006.

145. According to the historian Michelle Mart, during the Cold War "Israelis became 'American

ized,'" and this transformation was due in good part to a sense of "Judeo-Christian unity." "The Cultural Foundations of the US/Israel Alliance," Tikkun.org, November 11, 2006.

146. Jodie T. Allen and Alec Tyson, "The U.S. Publics Pro-Israel History," Pew Research Center, July 19, 2006; "Americans' Support for Israel Unchanged by Recent Hostilities," Pew Research Center press release, July 26, 2006; and Robert Ruby, "A Six-Day War: Its Aftermath in American Public Opinion," Pew Research Center, May 30, 2007.

147. Allen and Tyson, "The U.S. Public's Pro-Israel History"; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in Association with the Council on Foreign Relations, "America's Place in the World 2005: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public About International Affairs," November 2005, 11-12.

148. "Conspiracy Theories and Criticism of Israel in Aftermath of Sept. 11 Attacks," Anti-Defamation League press release, November 1, 2001.

149. Steven Kull (principal investigator), "Americans on the Middle East Road Map" (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, May 30, 2003), 9-11, 18-19.

150. "American Attitudes Toward Israel and the Middle East," survey conducted on March 18-25, 2005, and June 19-23, 2005, by the Marttila Communications Group for the Anti-Defamation League.

151. Andrew Kohut, "American Views of the Mideast Conflict," New York Times, May 14, 2002.

152. On Israeli responsibility for the second Lebanon war, see the ABC News-Washington Post poll conducted on August 3-6, 2006, and the CBS News-New York Times poll conducted on July 21-25, 2006, both of which can be found in "Israel, the Palestinians," PollingReport.com. Regarding the United States not taking sides, see the USA Today-GaWup poll, ibid.; and the Zogby poll taken August 11-15, 2006, the results of which are described in "Zogby Poll: U.S. Should Be Neutral in Lebanon War," Zogby International press release, August 17, 2006.